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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
is taxable only by the state in which it has so acquired a situs, Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra. A more difficult question arises in the case
of intangible property, for strictly speaking such property can never acquire a
permanent situs, and the term "situs" is not applicable to it, Farmer's Loan &
Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra, unless it has become an integral part of some
localized business, so as to acquire a "business situs." New Orleans v. Stempel,
175 U.S. 309 (1899). Where then can a succession or inheritance tax on intangible property be levied? From the recent cases it seems that only the state of
the domicile of the owner may tax the transfer. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v.
Minnesota, supra (municipal and state bonds) ; First National Bank of Boston
v. Maine, supra (shares of stock) ; Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Conmission,
supra (open account) ; Baldwin v. Missouri, supra (negotiable instruments). It
has been held that the state of the domicile of the cestui que trust could not tax
the transfer of the trust fund from the donor to the trustee in another state,
where the fund was to be kept. Safe Deposit Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1930).
The limiting of a state's jurisdiction to tax by means of the "due process"
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is criticized as reading into the Fourteenth
Amendment what is not there. Mr. Justice Holmes is a leader in the opposition
and wrote strong dissenting opinions in Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra, and Baldwin v. Missouri, supra. The objection to the limitation seems
valid, for the providing of a remedy against taxation of the same subject by
more than one state is a question for the legislature rather than for the courts,
and therefore the remedy should come by reciprocal legislation by the states.
30 Col. Law Rev. 405 (1930) ; 43 Harv. Law Rev. 792 (1930) ; see also 28 Col.
Law Rev. 806 (1928). But the Federal Constitution is a compact between the
United States to maintain peace and harmony among them; it is not a compact
between the United States and foreign countries. Therefore there is a basis
for holding that the jurisdiction of a state's taxing powers is limited by the
Constitution, and that there is no similar Constitutional Limitation of the Federal Government's jurisdiction to tax. Taxation is one form of taking property;
and therefore should be considered in view of the "due process" clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. So it is not difficult to see that in defining
the Constitutional limitation on the states' power to tax the court applied the
"due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It has been held that the
Federal Government may tax merely on the ground of citizenship, Cook v. Tait,
supra; but this latter ground could not be applied in the instant case, for the
deceased was not a citizen. Nor does the jurisdiction of the Federal Government
to tax depend on the nature of the tax. Cook v. Tait, supra. The court in the
instant case recognized that the evils of taxation of the same subject by more
than .one sovereignty should be dealt with by international treaties, and very
properly finds it impossible to read a limitation out of the Fifth Amendment
which would prevent double taxation, i.e., taxation of the same subject by the
United States and a foreign nation.
JQHN F. SAVAGE.

CONTEMPT-JURORS PRIVILEGE-NoN-APPLICATION OF PRIVILEGE.-The defendant was charged with contempt of court for giving answers which she knew to
be false and misleading in response to questions affecting her qualifications as a
juror. One Foshay and others were to be tried on the charge of using the mails
to defraud. The defendant was summoned as one of the panel of jurors. Evidence disclosed that she was opposed to serving on the jury until informed that

RECENT DECISIONS
Foshay was involved, for whom she had done office work for several years. She
had knowledge that if her employment with Foshay were discovered she would
not be accepted. In answer to the question of whether she had ever been in any
business of any kind, the defendant named all of her former employments,
except the one with Foshay. She answered in response to another question that
her mind was free from bias. In the defendant's trial for contempt, testimony
was admitted alleging that she had told other jurors Foshay was a victim of circumstances, stating the details, and giving the source of her information as being
a newspaper she had read before the trial. Other testimony was admitted showing that in the jury room she refused to listen to the arguments presented by
the evidence in the case. The jury was dismissed because unable to agree. The
defendant was the only one who held out for acquittal. Judgment of conviction;
writ of certiorari. Held, judgment affirmed. Clark v. United States, 53 Sup. Ct.
465, 77 L.Ed. 515 (1933).
Concealment of material facts by a juror upon a voir dire examination is
punishable as a contempt if its tendency and design is to obstruct justice. Likewise, a misstatement such as the one in the instant case relating to bias, is
punishable as contempt. The test applied to determine the existence of contempt
is whether or not there has been an obstruction of the workings of justice from
acts done in the presence of the court. Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 39 Sup.
Ct. 337, 63 L.Ed. 656 (1919). Perjury may be one of the elements of contempt.
In re Ulmer, 208 Fed. 461 (D.C. Oh., 1913); United States v. Appel, 211 Fed.
495 (D.C. N.Y., 1913); United States v. Karns, 27 F. (2) 453 (D.C. Old.,
1928); United States v. Dachis, 36 F. (2) 601 (D.C. N.Y., 1929); Lang v.
United States, 55 F. (2) 922 (C.C.A. 2d, 1932; United States v. McGovern,
60 F. (2) 880 (C.C.A. 2d, 1932). Deceit may be an element of contempt in
certain cases. Bowles v. United States, 50 F. (2) 848 (C.C.A. 4th, 1931);
United States v. Ford, 9 F. (2) (D.C. Mont., 1925). The combination of acts
which results in a trifling with the court and an obstruction of the processes of
justice is contempt. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749, 49 Sup. Ct. 471, 73
L.Ed. 938 (1929).
The question arises as to whether there was a violation of the juror's privilege. This privilege provides that the conduct of a juror during the deliberations
of the jury is secret and protected from disclosure, unless the privilege is
waived. IVoodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453 (1871); Nunns v. County Court,
188 App. Div. 424, 176 N.Y.S. 858 (1919); In re Cochran, 237 N.Y. 336, 143 N.E.
212 (1924). The basis for the privilege is public policy. Jurors might not feel
free to express their thoughts if they knew that the things they said might
later be made public. The privilege, however, will not apply where the juror has
been chosen through fraud. He must have acted in good faith before and after
becoming a juror before he can claim the protection of the privilege. Analogous
to this, is the situation of the client who consults his attorney for advice to
further a fradulent scheme. The attorney-client privilege will not protect the
client in such case. However, there must be something in addition to the charge
of fraud to do away with the privilege. O'Rourke v. Darishire,A.C., 581 (1920).
There must be some prima facie evidence to satisfy the judge that "the light
should be let~n." When that evidence is supplied, the seal of secrecy is broken.
Regina v. Cox, 14 Q.B.D. 153 (1884). The juror's privilege will not exist therefore, until the talesman validly becomes a juror and a part of the court. The
principal case therefore concludes, without precedent, that inasmuch as the
talesman never became a valid juror because of his fraudulent answers in the
voir dire examination, he cannot avail himself of the juror's privilege.
HER-MAN HURWITZ.

